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I. Introduction 
Is a CEO's statement that "I believe the TVs we manufacture 
have the highest resolution on the market"1 potentially action­
able as an "untrue statement of material fact" under § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act2 and Rule 10b-53 promulgated there­
under? If so, how does this statement map onto the elements of 
securities fraud? Must the CEO actually disbelieve the state­
ment? Must the matter addressed in the opinion—i.e., the resolu­
tion of the company's TVs—actually be false? How does the CEO's 
belief or disbelief intersect with the element of scienter? What 
portion of this statement must be material to investors—the 
CEO's expression of belief, the resolution of the company's TVs, 
or both? When is the "truth" about the statement disclosed for 
the purposes of assessing price impact and measuring loss— 
when it is revealed that the CEO disbelieved his or her prioi 
opinion or when it is revealed that the TVs did not have the 
highest resolution on the market? 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. 
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension un 
provides guidance on these questions but also raises new issu . 
In Omnicare, the Court charted a new course for opinions actio 
able under § 11 of the Securities Act. The Court pronounced a 
new test to differentiate statements of opinion fiom m;<.reDre-
fact; held that a statement of opinion is actmna ® as . , ueijef 
sentation of fact only if the speaker did not hold the stat^beliel 
and if the matter addressed in the opinion is macc^ liability if a 
that a statement of opinion can give rise to wnissi conveying 
reasonable investor would understand the opini 
untrue facts about the basis for the opinion. ^ apply 
An open question is whether Omnicare s^a6Cgome courts 
equally to opinions actionable as securities r ^ "alterna­
te applied Omnicare to securities fraud claim it * 0ther 
tive analysis,"7 as "instructive,"8 or as persuasi securities 
courts have simply assumed that Omnicare 
fraud claims.10 
* f at the University of 
Ij , Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associat.^-p'^Tation. 
aho College of Law, where she teaches securities g 
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, • v this essay analyzes when a speaker's 
Against this bac ^ntially actionable under § 10(b) and 
statement of belie P t ffact post-Omnieare." This es-
Rule 10b-5 as a false stateme^ partg Part „ summarizes the 
say PROCEEDLIN Drawing from the holdings m Omnicare, 
holdings in Omni • statements of fact from state-
Part III analyzes how to durtmgu fraudj and part Iy 
ments of opinion for p.urp^ actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 
analyzes when p' f f t Finally, Part V considers how 
MM-ffLnts rfa^securities fraud claim-scienter, material­
ity reliance and loss causation-apply to false statements of 
belief! and Part VI briefly concludes with proposed future areas 
of inquiry. 
II The Holdings in Omnicare 
Tn Omnicare the Supreme Court addressed whether purchas­
er in a public offering by Omnicare had stated a claim under 
§ 11 based on the following statements m the registration 
statement: 
• "We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare 
providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy 
practices are in compliance with applicable federal and sta e 
• "We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufac­
turers are legally and economically valid arrangements that 
bring value to the healthcare system and the patients that 
we serve."12 vvc oui vu. .10 11 
The purchasers alleged that these statements violated § 1 
because Omnicare's receipt of payments from drug manufactur­
ers violated anti-kickback laws and because none of Omnicare s 
officers and directors "possessed reasonable grounds" for the belie 
that they were in legal compliance.13 
The district court granted Omnicare's motion to dismiss, the 
Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
"to consider how § 11 pertains to statements of opinion. 
First, the Court classified these statements as opinions rather 
than as statements of fact. Despite the fact that lower cour s 
have struggled mightily to differentiate statements of opinion 
from statements of fact for purposes of liability under the securi­
ties laws,15 the Court characterized the discussion as "a mite 
silly." The Court relied on the definitions of "fact" and "op^1^11 
in two English dictionaries, published in 1927 and 1933. Ac 
cording to the Court, a fact is "a thing done or existing^' °r 
actual happening" and "expresses certainty about a thing, 
opinion is "a belieff,] a view" or "a sentiment which the mm^ 
forms of persons and things" and does not express certainty-
352 ©2015 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Winter 2015 
[VOL. 43:4 20151 FALSE STATEMENTS OF BELIEF AS SECURITIES FRAUD 
The Court characterized the difference in level of certainty be­
tween a statement of fact and a statement of opinion as the 
"[mlost important difference.19 Applying this test to the state­
ments at issue in the case the Court focused on the introductory 
words "I believe and held that the statements, which did not 
express certainty, were "pure statements of opinion."20 
Second, the Court held that an opinion can be actionable as "an 
untrue statement of a material fact" under § 11 only if the 
speaker did not hold the stated belief. According to the Court, 
because a statement of opinion lacks certainty, it explicitly af­
firms only one fact: "that the speaker actually holds the stated 
belief."21 The Court added a caveat, however: even if the speaker 
did not hold the stated belief, the opinion would not be actionable 
as a misstatement of fact if the matter addressed in the opinion 
were accurate.22 Here, where the purchasers did not contest that 
Omnicare's opinions were honestly held, the Court held that they 
were not actionable as untrue statements of material fact.23 
Third, the Court held that an opinion, even if not actionable as 
an untrue statement of material fact, potentially gives rise to li­
ability under § 11 if the speaker "omitted to state a material fact 
necessary to make [the opinion] not misleading."24 As the 
Court explained, "a reasonable investor may, depending on the 
circumstances, understand an opinion statement to convey facts 
about how the speaker has formed the 0Pini0n-°r,,'250i)?erw^ 
put about the speaker's basis for holding that view This is a 
contextual inquiry that examines the opinion from the perspec­
tive of a reasonable investor: 
The investor must identify 
the basis for the issuer's did not have-
did or did not conduct or the know & ^ .ggue misieading to 
fairiy ^in c:ntext 26 ns 
Because neither court below the judgment 
theory under this standard, t pr proceedings.27 
below and remanded the case or twQ portions of the 
This essay analyzes the impact ot th how are statements 
Omnicare opinion on securities rau . Wact for purposes of 
of opinion differentiated from s a • ion actionable as a false 
securities fraud? Second, w^en 1S iOb-5? And, finally, if a 
statement of fact under § 10(b) an allegedly false state-
securities fraud action is Pr^is , elements of a secun les 
ment of belief, how should the other elem 
fraud claim be analyzed? of Fact and 
III. The Distinction Between Stateme 
Statements of Opinion statements of opinion from 
Omnicare's new test to differentiate state ^ 
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ff*rt likely applies equally to securities fraud claims. 
statements of fact liKeiy PE• in 0mmcare suggests that its 
Nothing m the,C° rnnfined to § 11- Rather, the Court relied on 
fact-opinion test is; t ^ explain the distinction between a 
two English mcLon ment of opinion and reasoned that, 
statement of fact an under § n for "untrue statements] 
by exposing issuers incorporated this "everyday" 
of • • ' faC28'p %h 5 like § 11, prohibits "untrue statement[s] 
dlStioHact," and thus'likely incorporates this same "everyday-
distinction. claims, Omnicare's new fact-opinion 
Applied to secur . distinguish statements of fact from 
test will f^nge how courts d'stmgu^^ ^ ̂  . 
statements ofopm ^ ^ distinction: the "I know it when I 
mary approach!es 1to judgment or subjectivity 
f
et"' The3 b^ i a  Tes t  i s  a  combmatro/of the literal test and 
f • ^ent or subjectivity test. Like the judgment or subjectiv-
the speakers mental Proces^. ^ things."31 At the same 
rr». 
°PAfter'Omnicare, although one court has suggested 
it ferns clear that a statement of fact can be transformed mto a 
statement of opinion merely by adding the PreJ? fact-opinion 
believe." The Court provided two examples of the tact; p ^ 
distinction, and the inclusion of such an mtroducto y p ^ 
outcome-determinative in each example. In the first P > ^ 
Court characterized "the coffee is hot" as a statemen cond 
"I think the coffee is hot" as a statement of opinion. In tne 
example, the Court characterized "the TVs wemanu ac , 0f 
the highest resolution available on the market as a s a ^ 
fact and "I believe the TVs we manufacture have the 
olution available on the market" as a statement o op ^ 
Therefore, post-Omnicare, issuers and their agents will 1 josures> 
such introductory language more frequently in public dis 
to the extent permitted by the disclosure rules and borne 
market-36 . • e true: 
After Omnicare, it is less clear if the converse is likcwis ^ 
if an inherently uncertain statement is expressed wi ^ a 
introductory signal of uncertainty, will it be characteriz 
statement of opinion? For example, a statement abou 
•154 ©2015 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • W 
43-4 2015] FALSE STATEMENTS OF BELIEF AS SECURITIES FRAUD 
of reserves is arguably inherently uncertain,37 but the court 
quacy of res> ^ Financial Inc. Securities Litigationquestioned 
in In re G statement of opinion post-Omnicare: Defendants 
whether 1 contain the words 'believe' or 'think, but 
^TAuggest a greater sense of certainty." 
instead gg Omnicare is to examine the certainty of 
The better rule po^t O^^^ ̂  & jf 
the statement from t P t the statement as expressing 
reasonable inv®^ uh because the statement includes 
a lack of certa"^y ejle «x beiieve" or "I think" or because the 
introductory lang^ tly unCertain-then the statement should 
subject matter is mheren y example in one post-Omnicare 
be categorized as which are arguatty 
case, the court treated rlesoite the absence of prefatory 
inherently uncertain, as opinion P t-Omnicare case, the 
SSon language.3'Siroibriy.^nanother^ost^^ ̂  
rnurt characterized as an op nanroxen lowered . . • the 
gSSfi'Ci*' «a >—•«" — 
is inherently uncertain. Statements of Belief 
IV. Opinions Actiona e under § 11, an opinion is ac-
Omnicare's second holding-- a ' if the speaker di no 
tionable as a fel 
h0!?Rl1ob-5 InoJcarl the Coort^f^ actual{y and Rule iUD. A , T offirmc one fact, tnai uw v t0 b-
ment of opinion on y ^ (2) § u only expo the 
holds the stated belief an factW of 
ability for "untrue stateme an untruesta ^ ^ 
opinion. Both of |i|e QyS't0 securities the tart thot 
in Omnicare apply % nt of opinion on y ^ limited to the 
proposition that a , ^he stated bell support ^lS hu *..notpr actually holds in , citation in suyu ive 
context of § 11- *nde^'e,n torts law,43 wtacn£ J' interpret-
proposition is a treatisemn ^ 10b-5 than w^ Uability for 
when interpreting ^ Rule iob-5 o y Q icare s cone 
ing § 11- Second Ikej 11' appUes t0 se-
"untrue statements] ot ̂  propoSltl0ns likely 
sion drawn from . 46 R tbe speaker 1 
curities fraud claims. ^ holding^that even^ ^ actionable if 
Omnicare1 s cayea uebef the opinion w fact true ^ 
not hold the stated be! . opinionThe Court 
the matter addressed ities fraud da 
likely applies equally 
neuters • Securities Regulation La 
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on Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg which arose under 
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promul­
gated thereunder, for this caveat.48 In that case, quoting a district 
court case interpreting § 10(b), the Court held that "to recognize 
liability on mere disbelief or undisclosed motive without any 
demonstration that the proxy statement was false or misleading 
about its subject would authorize § 14(a) litigation confined solely 
to what one skeptical court spoke of as the 'impurities' of a 
director's 'unclean heart.' "49 According to the Virginia Bankshares 
Court, permitting liability on this basis would "threaten just the 
sort of strike suits and attrition by discovery that Blue Chip 
Stamps [a case interpreting § 10(b)) sought to discourage."50 Vir­
ginia Bankshares's holding, which itself relied on § 10(b) prece­
dent, is at least as persuasive in § 10(b) actions as in § 11 actions. 
Like § 11, claims under Rule 10b-5 are premised on "untrue state­
ment^] of material fact."51 Further, the Court has explicitly 
adopted the materiality standard from § 14(a) for claims under 
§ 10(b).52 
Therefore, post-Omnicare, a statement of opinion is likely ac­
tionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a false statement of fact 
only if (1) the speaker did not hold the stated belief (i.e., the 
opinion was subjectively false) and (2) the matter addressed in 
the opinion was not accurate (i.e., the opinion was objectively 
false).53 This resolves the pre-Omnicare split in authority, 
whereby some courts required both subjective and objective 
falsity in order for a statement of opinion to be actionable as se­
curities fraud and other courts merely required objective falsity.54 
Post-Omnicare, a statement of opinion must be both subjectively 
and objectively false in order to be actionable as securities fraud. 
An interesting question post-Omnicare is whether, in order for 
an opinion to be objectively false (as required by the Virginia 
Bankshares caveat), it is sufficient for the matter addressed in 
e opinion to be objectively unreasonable, even if it is not 
demonstrably false. Unfortunately, by giving short shrift to the 
distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion, 
* Omnicare Court failed to recognize the possibility that the 
addressed in an opinion might be inherently uncertain-
^pfhUi mclpahle of being proven true or false—and yet might 
nonetheless be objectively unreasonable. The subject matter of 
canah^nf^ • Omnicare Court chose as an example is 
rather flir, emfi Pr«oen ^se' tbus allowing the Court to state 
companv^W^1° ^ °Ur CE0 did not believe that her 
(surprise') n ^highest resolution on the market, but 
statement "55 Tf th r u 11 would not impose liability for her 
opinion WWP W Eourt bad instead chosen as an example an 
subject matter is inherently uncertain (such as the 
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causal relationship between a drug and a MPHIR.OI J-J.-
based on inconclusive data), the Court would have r^ nj 
that the subject matter of an opinion might not be demon 
false but might nonetheless b/objective^ 
mg liability for a disbelieved objectively unreasonable opinTon 
does not merely punish "the 'impurities' of a director's Wle*n XSf  ^ ,b6tter ™Ie Po«t-Omratconsis'TRNT 
with the Virginia Bankshares caveat, is to recognize that the 
objective falsity requirement is satisfied if the matter addressed 
in the opinion is either demonstrably false or objectively 
unreasonable.57 
V. Other Elements of a Securities Fraud Claim Based on 
a False Statement of Belief 
Post-Omnicare, a statement of belief is potentially actionable 
as a false statement of fact under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if (1) the 
speaker disbelieved the opinion expressed and (2) the matter ad­
dressed in the opinion was inaccurate. In order for such a state­
ment to form the basis of a securities fraud claim, however, the 
other elements of securities fraud must also be satisfied: scienter, 
materiality, reliance, and loss causation. As discussed below, 
these elements—whose contours are fairly well-settled in the 
context of other types of false statements—pose new challenges 
when applied to false statements of belief. 
A. Scienter 
When a securities fraud action is premised on an allegedly 
false statement of belief, two elements of the claim relate to the 
speaker's state of mind. As discussed above, the element of falsity 
requires the speaker to have actually disbelieved thesopinion 
expressed, contrary to the speaker's expression of belief. \ e e " 
ement of scienter requires the speaker to have made a ^ a se 
statement about his or her state of mind at least reckless y-
issue is whether, in order to satisfy the strong mfereHceol scien­
t e r  p l e a d i n g  s t a n d a r d , 6 0  a  p l a i n t i f f  m u s t  p l e a ^  a n y  f f U g  
facts other than those that support the speaker s 1 
opinion stated. , . „ i^110tPiv 
The better rule is to recognize that, if the.p am 1 ̂  ^ ̂  not 
pleads that a speaker expressed an op^mn inference of 
in fact hold, the plaintiff has also P^ it is 
scienter. Absent some sort of out s tbe contents of 
inconceivable that a speaker could fa y recklessly. As the 
his or her own brain without doing s Reynolds: "[Clertain 
Supreme Court recognized m Merc felse is normally to show 
statements are such that, to show i t^at someone would 
scienter as well. It is unlikely of the fact 
falsely say 'I am not married' without being 
©2015 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal 
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that his statement is false."61 One is equally as likely to know the 
contents of one's own brain as one s marital status, and thus mis. 
stating either should support a strong inference of scienter. This 
commonsense rule is a logical extension of the core operations 
inference" whereby allegations about a statement s falsity may 
be sufficient to allege a strong inference of management's scienter 
"where the nature of the relevant fact is of such prominence that 
it would be 'absurd' to suggest that management was without 
knowledge of the matter."62 This rule is also perhaps the purest 
example of what this essay's author has previously dubbed the 
"falsity-scienter inference," whereby "the well-pleaded falsity of a 
statement is sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter 
when (1) the truth is necessarily within the speaker's core knowl­
edge; and (2) the statement is sufficiently false to have necessar­
ily caught the speaker's attention."63 Indeed, consistent with this 
rule, post-Omnicare courts have recognized that the elements of 
falsity and scienter merge when applied to allegedly false state­
ments of belief.64 
B. Materiality 
As the Omnicare Court acknowledged in passing, a speaker's 
false statement of fact—that he or she believed the opinion 
expressed—must be materially misleading in order to be 
actionable.65 This raises an interesting question: when is there a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the 
speakers expression of belief about the matter addressed in the 
opinion to be important when making an investment decision?66 
There are three possible materiality scenarios, only the third of 
which is tenable. 
First, a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's 
false statement of belief to be important because a reasonable in­
vestor values candor from the officers and directors of companies 
in which he or she invests. Although this articulation has some 
logical appeal, courts should reject this materiality argument as 
an impermissible merging of falsity and materiality. If this 
articulation were successful, a speaker's misrepresentation of 
belief about anything—even the paint color on the board room's 
walls—would arguably be material. The Court rejected this 
bootstrapping of materiality to falsity in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 67 
e ixth Circuit had held that "information concerning ongoing 
acquisition discussions becomes material by virtue of the state­
ment denying their existence,"68 The Basic Court rejected the Sixth 
Circuits analysis: "This approach, however, fails to recognize 
^ ' °r(Jar t0 Prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must 
w at the statements were misleading as to a material fact. 
milt n0 en(?Uf^- a s^a^oment is false or incomplete, if the 
srepresented fact is otherwise insignificant." Therefore, a state-
358 
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ment of belief, if not independently material, does not become so 
merely because it is false. ™ so 
Second a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's 
false statement of belief to be important because (1) the matter 
addressed m the opinion is actually accurate and (2) the speaker's 
disbelief of the matter addressed in the opinion would demon­
strate that the speaker is uninformed or incompetent. The Vir­
ginia Bankshares caveat, which requires the subject matter of 
the opinion to be objectively false,69 forecloses this materiality 
argument. 
Third, a reasonable investor could arguably find a speaker's 
statement of belief to be important because it makes it more 
likely that the matter addressed in the opinion is accurate. To 
use the Omnicare Court's example, a reasonable investor could 
find it important when making an investment decision that a 
CEO stated "I believe that the TVs we manufacture have the 
highest resolution available on the market" because the CEO's 
expression of belief makes it more likely that company's TVs 
actually have the highest resolution. 
The materiality analysis is thus a two-step inquiry. First, is 
the subject matter addressed in the opinion important to a rea­
sonable investor? Second, if so, does the speaker's expression of 
belief convey meaningful information to a reasonable investor 
about the likelihood that the subject matter is accurate? 
The first step of this materiality inquiry is straightforward. For 
example, take a CEO's statement that "I believe the TVs we 
manufacture have the highest resolution available on the 
market." The first step of the materiality inquiry should focus on 
whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable inves-
tor would find the resolution of the company's TVs to be important 
when making an investment decision—likely depending on 
percentage of revenues associated with TV sa es if the 
importance of a TVs resolution to consumers Bycontrast if t 
CEO had expressed an opinion about, the foodI offered m feem 
ployee cafeteria, the opinion would likely ai stor wouid 
materiality inquiry because r®®s° king an investment 
consider that information important when mam g 
deThe°second step of this materiality inquiry 
factors. First, is the speaker someone ^ subject matter 
tor would expect to possess informai i jnvestor likely would 
of the opinion? For example a rea onable mv^ ̂  
expect the CEO to be informed about t Ph HR director to 
tors' products but probably would not expect 
possess that information. much tentativeness 
Second, is the opinion expressed with m ^ 
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that a reasonable investor would not interpret it as making the 
subject matter more likely? For example if the CEO had stated 
"Tactually have no idea, but I believe hat the TVs we manufac­
ture have the highest resolution available on the market," then a 
reasonable investor would probably not interpret the CEO's 
opinion as conveying meaningful information about the resolu­
tion of the company's TVs. 
Third is the basis for the opinion disclosed and available to 
investors, such that a reasonable investor could reach his or her 
own independent conclusion about the subject matter of the 
opinion? If so, the expression of belief would not convey any 
meaningful information to a reasonable investor, who could reach 
his or her own opinion. For example, if the CEO had stated 
"Based on the advertising materials from our five largest competi­
tors, I believe that the TVs we manufacture have the highest res­
olution on the market," a reasonable investor would not interpret 
the CEO's expression of belief as conveying any meaningful infor­
mation about the likelihood that the company's TVs indeed pos­
sess the highest resolution. A reasonable investor could assess 
the quality of the research performed by the CEO and make his 
or her own determination about whether the company's TVs have 
the highest resolution. (Of course, if the advertising materials 
actually reflected that a competitor's TV had a higher resolution, 
the embedded factual statement within the opinion would 
potentially be actionable as a false statement of fact.70) As this 
author has previously argued, courts making this assessment 
should draw on the deep body of case law developed in the context 
of defamation, which differentiates opinions that imply undis­
closed defamatory facts from those that do not (usually because 
the factual basis for the opinion is stated).71 
There is an interesting overlap between the second step of the 
materiality analysis in a false statement of belief case and the 
analysis of potential omissions liability under Omnicare. Under 
Omnicare, in addition to being potentially actionable as a false 
statement of belief, an opinion can give rise to omissions liability 
if a reasonable investor would understand the opinion statement 
as conveying untrue facts about the speaker's basis for holding 
that view.72 As the Court explained, "[t]o avoid exposure for omis­
sions under § 11, an issuer need only divulge an opinion's basis, 
or else make clear the real tentativeness of its belief."73 Therefore, 
it a speaker states the basis for his or her opinion or expresses 
sufficient tentativeness, the opinion is neither actionable as a 
aise statement of fact—because the second step of the material-
i y analysis fails—nor as a misleading omission—because no rea-
1 V?S!°r would understand the opinion as conveying 
facts about the speaker's basis for that opinion. On the 
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flip side, however, it may be easier for a plaintiff to plead facts in 
support of the second step of the materiality analysis than to 
plead actionable omissions. In order to plead the second step of 
the materiality analysis, a plaintiff need only plead facts in sup­
port of the proposition that the speaker's expression of belief 
conveyed meaningful information to a reasonable investor about 
the likelihood that the subject matter is accurate. In order to 
plead an omissions claim, however, a plaintiff must "identify par­
ticular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's 
opinion . . . whose omission makes the opinion statement at is­
sue misleading."74 
C. Reliance and Loss Causation 
Finally, pinpointing the moment that the purported "truth" is 
disclosed to the market is potentially relevant to the elements of 
reliance and loss causation. If the plaintiffs are relying on the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the defendants 
may try to rebut the presumption by producing evidence of a lack 
of "price impact."75 The defendants may seek to accomplish this 
by showing that the disclosure of the "truth" did not impact the 
market price.76 Likewise, in order to demonstrate loss causation, 
plaintiffs often attempt to show that the stock price dropped 
upon disclosure of the "truth."77 
If a securities fraud claim is premised on a false statement of 
belief about a subject matter, there are two potential moments 
that the "truth" is disclosed to the market: (1) when the market 
discovers that the speaker actually disbelieved the earlier-
expressed opinion; or (2) when the market discovers that the 
matter addressed in the opinion was inaccurate..te the 
matter the former "truth" would rarely be disclosed to the 
market'. Rather, the company would likely f ™ 
"Although we believed that our TVs had tiie, highest 
the market, we have now discovered that one of our competi 
TVs has a higher resolution." inaccuracy 
The better analysis is to treat the of 
of the matter addressed m the lge opini0n. Under this the-
the risk" concealed by the speak statement itself is not 
ory, even if the truth aa^ demonstrate i0Ss causation 
revealed to the market, Pjam raused by the materialization of 
if "the loss was foreseeable and caus * t For example, 
the risk concealed by the frau u „ . jnc Securities Liti-
in the post-Omnicare case of'Inn*.ffg had t0 ii;point 
gation, the defendants ar^e h speaker actually disbelieve 
AATA-.STSTFI®5 '"—- ,*M1 
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plead loss causation. 
The court rejected this argument, holding that the disclosure of 
the truth about the matter addressed in the opinion was suf­
ficient to plead loss causation: 
Although it is not clear what portion of the loss can be pegged to 
BioScrip's prior misstatements as compared to the Government's 
potential lawsuit, at the pleading stage a Plaintiff "need not demon­
strate that defendants' misstatements or omissions caused all of 
plaintiffs' losses. Rather, plaintiffs need only allege facts that would 
allow a factfinder to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole 
loss to [the defendant's alleged] misstatements." . . . Plaintiffs' al­
legations ascribe some rough portion of the loss to the misstate­
ments, particularly in light of the fact that, prior to the corrective 
disclosure, the market had been entirely unapprised of the fact that 
BioScrip was even involved in the Government's investigation into 
Novartis , . . Plaintiffs have adequately plead that the loss was 
foreseeable to BioScrip at the time they made the misstatements 
and that the risk concealed materialized, and was exacerbated by, 
BioScrip's misstatements.80 
This is the better analysis, both as applied to loss causation and 
to price impact. 
VI. Conclusion 
Hopefully, this essay will aid litigants, courts, market partici­
pants, and scholars when analyzing allegedly false statements of 
belief as false statements of fact under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
post-Omnicare. A separate question, also influenced by Omnicare, 
is how to analyze whether an opinion gives rise to omissions li­
ability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The author, and hopefully 
other scholars, will engage in this line of inquiry in future work. 
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